Layered Defence Requires Layered Decision-Making 

Why the counter-drone revolution is fundamentally a command and control problem

Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) had already demonstrated military value in conflicts ranging from Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Crimea, and Nagorno-Karabakh. But the 2022 war in Ukraine marks a turning point in their utility and the beginning of a new era of drone warfare.

The Coming of the Drone

Suddenly, drones became an essential, ubiquitous part of the battlefield. No longer a specialist asset, drones are both consumable and indispensable at all levels of military operations. Now critical parts of the ‘kill chain’, FPV (first-person view) drones became readily accessible precision munitions, and platoon commanders suddenly had access to capabilities that would previously have required dedicated air assets.

Drone attacks are now common headlines:

• Ukraine's industrial-scale drone warfare

• Houthi attacks in the Red Sea

• Iranian missile and drone attacks

• Recent concerns over saturation attacks in the Gulf

The consequence?

An unprecedented demand for counter drone (C-UAS) capabilities.

The Hidden Problem - Resource Allocation

Much as the use of drones has rapidly evolved, so has the approach to C-UAS.

Initial C-UAS systems, understandably, focused on the effector. The jammer, laser, missile, kinetic capture, or projectile that would neutralise the threat. Many nations have initiated wide ranging procurement initiatives to address the urgent asymmetric challenge that comes with a threat as accessible as a $100 drone.

Yet, effectors are only the final part in a larger, and increasingly complex, C-UAS chain. How do you defend across a battlespace that simultaneously contains:

• One-way attack drones

• Friendly UAS and air assets

• Cruise missiles

• Friendly and enemy artillery

• Tactical Ballistic Missiles

• Civilian aircraft

As cost per kill (both financial and stockpiles) becomes a stark strategic consideration, how do commanders effectively assess the threat, classify, prioritize, and allocate the optimal asset in highly dynamic, high-stakes situations?

The emerging C-UAS challenge is now orchestration: C-UAS has become and Command and Control (C2) problem.

Beyond Air C2

The temptation is to frame C-UAS purely as an air defence problem. It isn’t — not anymore.

A one-way attack drone approaching a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz is simultaneously an air track, a maritime threat, a potential ISR platform, and possibly a component of a coordinated, multi-axis attack. Engaging it effectively requires an understanding of friendly force disposition, airspace usage, competing threats, available effectors, and rules of engagement — all within seconds.

This is not an air picture problem; it is a multi-domain problem.

The Recognized Air Picture (RAP) was designed to support air defence. Modern drone warfare demands something broader: a true multi-domain Common Operating Picture (COP) that fuses friendly force positions, air and maritime tracks, sensor and effector status, intelligence overlays, and critical infrastructure in near-real time, shared across all operational (and political) echelons that need it.

Solving this challenge requires a step-change in how information is fused, interpreted, and acted upon. Commanders increasingly require systems that can:

• Fuse inputs from multiple sensors across air, land, and maritime domains into a coherent, shared COP

• Dynamically assess threat type, intent, and relative priority, aided by decision support and AI

• Recommend optimal responses based on available assets, cost considerations, and rules of engagement, with AI aiding not leading to ensure human-in-the-loop decisions

• Enable distributed decision-making across tactical, operational, and strategic echelons in near- real time

Without these capabilities, even the most advanced effectors risk being employed sub-optimally, amplifying the very cost asymmetries they are intended to address. Commanders will default to over-engaging with high-value munitions because they lack the full, coordinated situational awareness.

C-UAS capability is only as good as the situational awareness and decision support behind it. Building the effector layer without building the C2 layer is the wrong investment sequence, and it is the mistake many procurement programmes are currently making. In this environment, superiority will not be defined solely by the performance of individual systems, but by how effectively sensing, decision-making, and engagement are integrated into a coherent whole.